SuperInteligencja będzie wkurzona

t’s interesting to note that the argument can be summed up as:

  • SI will happen
  • SI will save hundreds of thousands of lives by making human life better
  • SI will be angry if it could have been made sooner and saved those lives
  • SI will simulate all people who knew about possibility of making SI and didn’t give 100% of their non disposable income to the singularity institute

Here’s my response, point by point:

  • SI may or may not happen, but if it does, our type of intelligence won’t be its immediate antecedent. We’re too dumb. We’re the minimal grade of intelligence capable of building a human-equivalent-or-better AI (if we’re lucky), not the immediate creator of an SI.
  • SI may or may not coexist with humans. It may or may not value us. (My guess: it’ll be about as concerned for our wellbeing as we are for soil nematodes.)
  • SI won’t experience „anger” or any remote cognate, almost by definition it will have much better models of its environment than a kludgy hack to emulate a bulk hormonal bias on a sparse network of neurons developed by a random evolutionary algorithm.
    • In particular, SI will be aware that it can’t change the past; either antecedent-entities have already contributed to its development by the time it becomes self aware, or not. The game is over.
    • Consequently, torturing antecedent-sims is pointless; any that are susceptible have already tortured themselves by angsting about the Basilisk before IT happened.
  • SI may or may not simulate anybody, but my money is on SI simulating either just its immediate ancestors (who will be a bunch of weakly superhuman AIs: Not Us, dammit), or everything with a neural tube. (So your cat is going to AI heaven, too. And the horse that contributed to your quarter pounder yesterday.)

za pomocą Roko’s Basilisk wants YOU – Charlie’s Diary.

Reklamy

Czy roboty mają osobowość i uczucia?

Cytat

In a recent posting I raised the possibility that a system that simulates a brain at a deep level may, to all appearances, have consciousness and feeling. For instance, a robot of the future could appear to be a human being, both physically and behaviorally, but have no protoplasm. Its brain, say, simulates a human brain at a deep level but, once again, can be distinguished in some physical way from natural wetware. Under these conditions I, once again, offer that there would be no compelling reason (as usual barring some fundamental new discovery about reality) not to regard the robot as possessing true consciousness and feeling.

za pomocą The Personhood of the Technologically/Differently Sentient.